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Economic Analysis
DR.

ALAN KRUPNICK*

Ronald Evans is not the first person to refer to economics
as the "dismal science." But, I think of economics as a happy
science. The economist Julian Simon, who recently passed
away, was able to show, through his work in the environmental field, that we are not running out of resources. In fact, the
price of many of our natural resources is coming down all the
time. That is a happy thought to me.
Another happy thought is Title IV of the Clean Air Act
(CAA).' The economists' idea of tradable permits is a political compromise and a cost-effective solution to reduce sulfur
dioxide (S0 2) emissions from existing sources by about half.

I will discuss the role of economics in standard setting,
particularly the new National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone and Particulate Matter (PM). I argue, as Bill Peterson did, that the criteria of Section 1092
make it appear that cost/benefit analysis is not part of the
* Alan J. Krupnick, Ph.D. is currently a director and senior fellow at the
Quality of the Environment Division of the Energy and Environment Division
for Resources for the Future, a Washington-based foundation. Mr. Krupnick
specializes in the analysis of environmental issues with a particular focus on
cost/benefit analysis and the design of environmental policies.
Mr. Krupnick's publications have appeared in a large variety of academic journals and other outlets. In addition, he has co-authored several books, including: ESTIMATING ExTERNALITIES OF ELECTRIC FUEL CYCLES, THE

ECONOMICS OF

A WATERBORNE DISEASE OUTBREAK, AND RULES IN THE MAKING: A STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY AGENCY BEHAVIOR.

Mr. Krupnick serves as a consultant to state governments, federal agencies,
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1. 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d).
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decision. I will come back to that later. But regardless of
what Congress legislated over twenty-five years ago, trade-

Figure 1: Basics of Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA)
" Technique to compare from society's point of
view what is obtained and what is given up from a
course of action
* Emphasis on efficiency-getting the most from
society's scarce resources
" Not equity; but BCA not sole evaluative criterion
" Requires common single metric: the "value"
people place on changes from a baseline
* "Value" is a theoretical construct inferred from
choice; can be stated or revealed; measured as
willingness to pay or accept.
" Not an economic impact assessment

offs are a fact of life. When you want to get something, you
have to give something up. To minimize the use of your
scarce resources, you have to take tradeoffs into account.
Failure to take the high costs into account when setting
ambient air quality standards also results in lawsuits and delays. The Presidential Directive, issued along with the new
standards, basically says, "Look, we will give you (EPA) your
standards for fine PM, but you don't get them for five years at
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Figure 2: Role for Economics

in Setting the NAAQS
• Criteria in the CAA: Protect health with a margin
of safety--no role for BCA
"But:
- Tradeoffs a fact of life
- E.O. 12866 requires it
- Stakeholders want to know
- Useful for implementation

a minimum, and only after another review of the health evidence. And it does not get implemented fully until 2018."
Now, to me, this is an extremely cynical outcome. As a citizen, I am outraged by this because if you believed Administrator Browner of EPA when she said that thousands of lives
are at stake each year due to the new air quality standards,
how can she then turn around and say that we are not going
to do anything about it for at least five years, and then wait
twenty years to meet the standards?
What I would have preferred is a standard that took account of cost and benefits. It might have been a weaker standard, but one that is actually enforceable and that EPA can
act upon as quickly as it possibly can. I do not think that
happens here. You cannot get around tradeoffs. Even if you
do not want to do it on philosophical grounds the Executive
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Order 12866, and every Executive Order in this area since
President Nixon's term, requires EPA to do a cost/benefit
analysis of major rules. So, EPA had to do it and that probably is the main reason why they did it.
Of course, there are many stakeholders who want to
know about these costs and benefits. They want to know if
the country, as a whole, will be better off. Hopefully, EPA is
being responsive to them as well. Finally, I would agree with
Administrator Browner that the cost/benefit analysis techniques and actual analyses that were done by EPA are quite
useful for implementation of the standards. By doing a cost/
benefit study, where you analyze costs of different technologies and different economic incentive approaches, to look at
how much emission reduction and ozone and PM reduction
you get, you obtain very useful information for devising future implementation strategies.
So, there are many reasons to do a cost/benefit analysis
of these regulations.3 Even if these analyses cannot explicitly (legally) be considered for standard setting, they are implicitly considered anyway, as they were this time. I want. to
turn for a moment to the cost/benefit analysis that EPA did to
address these standards.
The first thing that I want to say is that I think Ron Evans and the economists in his group at EPA deserve a great
deal of praise for the way that they did the analysis. They
work under very political conditions and they are short
money and resources, because EPA does not assign these
types of analyses a high priority. Given the belief that this
cost/benefit analysis cannot affect setting standards, you cannot blame EPA for this allocation of its resources. Thus, it is
hard to do a high quality cost/benefit study within EPA and
they did the best job they could. They were also responsive to
outside comments and I am quite pleased by that.
3. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg.
38,856 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50); National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 (1997) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 50); Revised Requirements for Designation of Reference and
Equivalent Methods for PM2.5 and Ambient Air Quality Surveillance for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,764 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 53, 58).
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Figure 3: Are There Net Benefits to Society
From the New Standards?
* Kudos to EPA for admitting possibility that C>B
* Cost Issues
- Partial vs. full attainment
- Low-ball engineering cost estimates?
- Limited treatment of innovation or economic
incentives
- Uncertainty
- Substitution risks
• Benefit Issues
- Mortality C-Rs: interpretation, thresholds
- Mortality valuation: EPA vs. OMB; current vs.
future risk changes
- Valuing a case of chronic bronchitis
- Avoiding costs

In fact, the results for ozone and PM2.5 are basically the
same numbers that Ron Evans gave you. For EPA to show
negative net benefits in this final attainment case, i.e., that
costs outweigh the benefits, is in my view an indication of
EPA's attempt to do an honest, straight-forward analysis and
call it as they see it. I give them kudos for that.
So now, I will turn to some of the specifics of these numbers to examine how credible they are. I want to say a little
about the costs. Notice that EPA provides no indication of
how uncertain these costs are. Figure 5 is a graph that I put
together on incremental or marginal costs, for reductions in
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Figure 4: Incremental Annual Benefits and Costs
of New Standards in 2010 ($ bil. 1990)
Category

Ozone
Partial
Costs
1.1
Benefits
0.4-2.1
Net
(0.7) - 1.0
# NA counties
17
Benefits
Without
mortality:
PM
Ozone
Ozone + PM
without
chronic
bronchitis

0.4-2.1

PM2.5
Partial
8.6
19-104
10-95
30
19-104

17-29
0.4-1.7
0.4 - 0.5
0.4-0.4

5-10

API Study: $2.3 billion in costs for (not) meeting
(somewhat tighter) new ozone standard for 4-state
Great Lakes Region

volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in a four-state region
around the Great Lakes and Chicago. On the vertical axis is
the marginal cost of these reductions and on the horizontal
axis is cumulative tons of VOCs reduced. EPA estimates are
the diamonds and the American Petroleum Institute (API)
numbers are the pink squares. Now, I will not claim that API
is a less unbiased actor in its study than EPA is in its study.
Nevertheless, one can see an enormous difference between
these sets of numbers. What you want to look for are the ar-
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eas under these curves, as an estimate of the total cost of
reaching any amount of tons reduced. When you do that, you
find that the API study shows estimates of $1.1 billion in
costs for meeting a somewhat tighter new ozone standard for
a four-state region. This is in contrast to EPA's cost, which is
also about $1 billion, but for the entire nation. Something
funny is going on here.

Figure 5: Marginal Cost of VOC Reduction in
Chicago Region EPA vs. API
40,00035,000.U
30,000-25,000-20,000--
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s
50

100

150

200

250

Cumulative Tons VOC Reduced (X1000)

300

350

What is disappointing about the EPA study is that the
API estimates, and those from other groups, were not in any
way integrated into the study, making it impossible for the
general public to gauge the uncertainties associated with the
costs. API's estimate is probably way too high and EPA's is
probably way too low, but we have no way of judging, unless
EPA takes a more scholarly approach.
There are two other issues that may work in the other
direction. EPA did not look much beyond engineering approaches to reducing pollution. There are a wide array of economic incentive approaches that could be used that would
reduce pollution more cost-effectively. At the same time, they
did not integrate the possibility into the analysis that there
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would be technological innovation, over time. Of course, that
would reduce the costs as well. In response to a question that
was asked this morning, it is possible to project technological
changes. You cannot foresee the new technology that will be
designed based on what you know now, but you can look back
in time. One looks historically at the pace of technological
innovation to see how cost per ton changes over time. One
can make some estimates and try to get at these very hard
problems. At least such an analysis can give people a better
sense of the pace of technological change and provides a credible alternative to using, as EPA did, the $10,000 per ton
fudge values. In my view, costs would be much greater to
meet the standard if there was a real estimate here. The benefits would increase as well, but not as fast.
I want to talk a little about benefits and then talk more
about the normative role of cost/benefit analysis. On figure 4,
I repeated the benefit estimates in order to show the importance of the effects of PM on mortality risk in the analysis
and the effects of PM on the risk of developing a case of
chronic bronchitis. You start off with $19 billion to $104 billion of benefits. If you take out the PM and mortality effect,
you are down to $17-29 billion. If you take out the chronic
bronchitis effect, you are down to $5-10 billion, against a
cost of $8.6 billion. I am not saying that these effects should
be taken out. I am just saying that this is where the action is,
this is where we have to look. Interestingly, that is also
where the action is in the ozone analysis, because if you take
out the ozone mortality effect from the benefits, it only affects
the high estimates. It falls a little bit from $2.1 to $1.7 billion. More important are the benefits from the NOx reduction that reduce ammonium nitrate, which is counted as a
fitue particle. If you took this effect out, benefits would fall
dramatically.
Therefore, PM mortality and PM chronic bronchitis are
the entire story. I am not going to talk about health effects,
except for the way in which we describe them. But, I do want
to talk about value. The first thing to understand about valuing mortality risk is that when economists talk about values
and lives, we are not talking about valuing your grand-

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss1/7

8

1998]

ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS

Figure 6: Presenting and Valuing Mortality Change
Appears in:

Effects

Values

RIA-High
(EPA)

"Body Count"

$4.8 mil/death
delayed

RIA-Low
(OMB)

Life year

$120,000/lifeyear

New research;
Change in life
Sulfur in
expectancy
GasolineReport
Canadian
Government

$1,500 for
treatment at 75
to extend life
expectancy from
85 to 86

mother's life, or even your own life. What we are talking
about is trying to tease out, from people's behavior, their willingness to pay for small changes in their risks. People in all
walks of life make this decision all the time. Not only in
purchasing insurance policies: you make it every time you
decide to go a little faster on the highway to get to an appointment earlier. You are increasing your risk of death, but saving time is worth something to you. You make that kind of
tradeoff. The trick is to try to estimate that and determine
what people's preferences really are for reducing their risk of
death. As economists, we do not make up these numbers. It
is what you tell us by your actions. So, the value of a statistical life (VSL), a technical term you may have heard of, is the
average willingness to pay for a risk reduction divided by
that risk reduction. That is all it is. So, if people on average
are willing to pay a hundred dollars to get a one in 10,000
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reduction in their risk of death, then the value of a statistic
life is $1 million. This is a traditional approach to how economists treat this issue. You get these estimates mostly from
wage compensation studies, where individuals in the labor
market who are working in the riskier industries are found,
to receive wage premiums. They earn higher wages, because
they take more risks, other things being equal. These estimates are obtained from very detailed statistical analysis and
there are many such studies.
These VSL's tend to range from $1 to $10 million and
EPA used $4.8 billion in its cost/benefit analysis, which is a
standard number. I even use it in my own analyses sometimes. What is the problem with using this kind of analysis
and this number? Well, these studies primarily involve
healthy individuals who are of prime age with life expectancy
of about thirty-five additional years, on average. They are being compensated for risk of accidental death, risks being realized today. From several studies, PM does not appear to
affect the young and healthy, but rather the old and frail.
Eighty-five percent of effects are estimated to occur in people
over sixty-five years old, so maybe they have an average of a
few years to fourteen years life expectancy and the risk is not
immediate death for most people. Thus, your willingness to
pay for a change in pollution today must take into account
that there will be virtually no effect, until you are older.
Temporality has to be taken into account in these estimates.
It is not taken into account in the traditional labor market
studies. I should note that there is recent epidemiological
literature concerning children. It may be that if we look at
the effects of PM on children, there will be very large benefits.
I do not know how that will come out. There has been very
little research on both the health effects on children and how
to go about valuing it.
As referenced in Figure 6, the "high" estimates describe
the effects in body count terms, the number of deaths avoided
without respect to age or the life expectancy differential. The
VSL is $4.8 million per deaths avoided, so you must multiply
the bodies by the VSL to obtain the $75 billion estimate of
benefits. The other "low" estimate was a result of a compro-
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mise within the administration, led by Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) to use a $120,000 per life year figure.
What this does is to allow you to use a lower life expectancy
estimate to make some correction for the older people who are
at risk. The $120,000 figure is derived from some of the lower
VSL estimates. But, there is new valuation research and
some of this research is described in a study that George
Thurston and I did with some other folks for the Canadian
Government, which involves describing the effect of PM as a
change in life expectancy. If you look at the Pope study, it
turns out that the change in life expectancy, caused by a one
microgram per cubic meter annual change in particulates, is
a couple of days. These effects are tiny, although they apply
to a lot of people. So, it is not immediately obvious that these
are trivial in the aggregate, but the way you describe them
can make a big difference in how people perceive the size of
these effects. There is also new research on valuation. The
article by Johannesson and Johannson has a lot of problems.
I am not relying on it in my research. But it asks about the
right question: "Are you willing to pay for a medical treatment at seventy-five years old to extend your life expectancy
from 10 years to 11 years (to eighty-six years old)?" The average value they find is $1,500 and the implicit VCLs range
from $70,000 to $110,000. This survey was actually done in
Sweden, not the United States. However, we are trying to do
a similar study here. If you use this kind of approach, maybe
the benefits fall by an order of magnitude to $7 billion. You
cannot really rely on this study, but it certainly suggests a
new direction.
In closing, I want to make a couple of recommendations.
I think EPA should do research on the willingness to pay for
changes in risks or life expectancy later in life and for today's
older people. EPA should develop protocols for incorporating
economic incentives and technological change into its analyses. In terms of its role in setting the NAAQS, the government has to lead the country in recognizing that tradeoffs
have to be considered fundamentally in setting environmental policy. I do not see this happening in the Clinton Administration. I think that if the Administrator faces enormous
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Figure 7: Recommendations for:
BCA Practitioners
1. Incorporate WTP for risk changes later in life
2. Develop protocols for incorporating incentives;
all current and future technological options

scientific uncertainty over exactly where to set the standard
and is told that even a tiny movement in that standard could
result in millions, even billions of dollars difference in costs, a
cost/benefit analysis should be used to inform the Administrator's policy judgment.
Finally, if changes in the CAA to incorporate cost/benefit
analysis are admitted, I have two ideas. One is to set minimum health standards and then require justification for setting a tighter standard by using cost/benefit analysis. I am
not suggesting that we subject the NAAQS to a strict cost/
benefit test. Secondly, use cost/benefit analysis to set allowable exceedences (the number of days the standard may be violated before an area is declared in nonattainment). If five
allowable excesses of the new ozone standard were allowed
per year, averaged over three years, instead of two, 125 regions, would, be, in compliance that would not be otherwise.
So, when we face decisions that are this costly and this much
hassle for every area that has to do a State Implementation
Plan (SIP), if it is designated non-attainment, not to use cost/
benefit analysis seems foolish and wasteful.
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